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R 241605Z FEB 88
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7818
INFO AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
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USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 SAN SALVADOR 02487

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PINS, MCPAP, ES

SUBJECT: THE FMLN TODAY: 7,000-7,800 -- LESS
EFFICIENT MILITARILY, RELYING ON ECONOMIC
SABOTAGE, IN IT FOR THE LONG HAUL

u.c
5/24/93

- REF: A) SAN SALVADOR 00475;
- B) B7 SAN SALVADOR 16913
- C) SAN SALVADOR 1338
- D) SAN SALVADOR 2034

(12)

1. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY

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AFTER PEAKING AT NEARLY 12,000 COMBATANTS IN 1984, EL SALVADOR'S FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN) RANKS STEADILY DECLINED UNTIL 1986 WHEN THEY APPEAR TO HAVE LEVELLED OFF AT ROUGHLY 7,000 FULL-TIME COMBATANTS. CURRENT RECRUITING EFFORTS SEEM TO ENABLE THE FMLN TO MAINTAIN INDEFINITELY A 7,000-MAN LEVEL, WHICH IT MAY REGARD AS AN OPTIMUM SIZE. LOSSES CAN BE REPLACED -- BUT INCREASINGLY BY CHILDREN UNDER 15, DECREASING THE FMLN'S MILITARY

EFFICIENCY AND PUSHING IT TOWARD A STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE, RATHER THAN MILITARY CONFRONTATION. THE THINNING OUT OF FMLN RANKS WAS, IN PART, PROMPTED BY THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES' (ESAF) AERIAL SUPPORT STRATEGY BEGUN IN 1983 WHICH ALSO FORCED THE FMLN TO BREAK DOWN ITS COMBAT BATTALIONS INTO SMALL, MOBILE, HIT-AND-RUN TEAMS TO CARRY OUT ATTACKS AGAINST THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE BUT AVOID DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE ESAF'S MAIN GROUND UNITS.

3. THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS REPORT IS TO ILLUSTRATE HOW STRATEGY AND NUMBERS HAVE COINCIDED TO PRODUCE A SMALLER FMLN. THE FMLN IS NO LONGER A THREAT TO THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY. HOWEVER, THROUGH AN ECONOMIC SABOTAGE POLICY, THE FMLN RETAINS NEGATIVE LEVERAGE OVER THE PACE OF CONSOLIDATION OF A FUNCTIONING, PLURALIST DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM. WHILE THE FMLN CANNOT WIN, IT HAS NOT LOST. WHILE FORCED TO ABANDON THE GOAL OF QUICK MILITARY VICTORY, THE FMLN HAS ADAPTED TO CHANGES IN ESAF STRATEGY BY ADOPTING THE STRATEGY OF OVERTHROWING THE DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT THROUGH A WAR OF ATTRITION. FEWER COMBATANTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE

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PROLONGED POPULAR WAR STRATEGY. END SUMMARY.

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FMLN NUMBERS
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4. FIGURES VARY ON FMLN COMBATANT STRENGTH. THE ESAF'S PRESS OFFICE, COPREFA, CURRENTLY ESTIMATES THAT THERE ARE 6,290 FULL-TIME FMLN COMBATANTS, WHILE CAJIT PLACES THE NUMBER AT 7,000-7,800. DIFFERENCES IN METHODOLOGY ACCOUNT FOR SOME OF THE DISCREPANCY. IN ADDITION, OTHER ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ESAF HAVE COMPILED THEIR OWN ESTIMATES OF GUERRILLA STRENGTH. FOR EXAMPLE, THE NUMBERS PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DNI) AND THE REGIONAL (BRIGADE) INTELLIGENCE CENTERS (RIC), VARY WIDELY FROM ESAF AND CAJIT ESTIMATES. DNI ROUTINELY ADDS 25 PERCENT TO MAKE UP FOR POSSIBLE ERRORS. ITS FIGURES ARE THEREFORE OF QUESTIONABLE UTILITY IN TRYING TO GAUGE THE ACTUAL STRENGTH OF FMLN FORCES.

5. CAJIT, WHILE ADMITTING THAT ITS METHOD IS NOT PERFECT, IS CONSIDERED THE MOST RELIABLE BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN CONSISTENT IN THE METHODOLOGY USED TO CIRCULATE GUERRILLA NUMBERS OVER THE YEARS. CAJIT'S

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88SAN 5A002487

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METHODOLOGY, KNOWN AS THE "UNIT ACCOUNTING APPROACH," DERIVES FMLN COMBATANT STRENGTH BY DETERMINING, WHERE POSSIBLE, THE PRECISE STRENGTH AND STRUCTURE OF EACH GUERRILLA UNIT AS OF A SPECIFIC DATE. IT ATTEMPTS TO DOCUMENT THE FIGURES WITH EVIDENCE FROM CAPTURED

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ACTION 55-00INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W
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FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7819
INFO AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 SAN SALVADOR 02487

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, MCAP, ES
SUBJECT: THE FMLN TODAY: 7,000-7,800 -- LESS

DOCUMENTS AND INTERVIEWS WITH CAPTURED GUERRILLAS AND DEFECTORS. CAJIT COUNTS ONLY FMLN PERSONNEL SERVING AS COMBATANTS OR MEMBERS OF THE MILITIA (PART-TIME COMBATANTS). THOSE WHO PROVIDE SERVICES, SUCH AS NURSES, LITTER BEARERS, COOKS, COMMUNICATORS, ETC., EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY BE ARMED AT TIMES, DO NOT COUNT AS COMBATANTS. NOR DOES THE FMLN LEADERSHIP COUNT. ERP COMMANDER JOAQUIN VILLALOBOS, THEREFORE, IS NOT LISTED AS A COMBATANT.

6. CAJIT'S FIRST ESTIMATE OF ARMED FMLN STRENGTH WAS 9,585-10,785 IN 1983. BY EARLY 1984, FMLN STRENGTH PEAKED AT NEARLY 12,000 COMBATANTS BEFORE
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BEGINNING A SHARP DECLINE. IN SEPTEMBER 1986, CAJIT ESTIMATED FMLN COMBATANT STRENGTH AT ABOUT 7,350-8,150, REPRESENTING A 23 PERCENT NET DROP SINCE THE 1984 HIGH. CAJIT'S PROJECTED FMLN COMBATANT FIGURE FOR LATE 1987 OF 7,000-7,800, IS ABOUT 4.5 PERCENT LOWER THAN IN 1986 (A NON-APPRECIABLE CHANGE CONSIDERING THE MARGIN OF ESTIMATING ERROR OF OVER FIVE PERCENT). THE REDUCTION IN THE FMLN'S RANKS APPEARS TO HAVE PRIMARILY AFFECTED ITS

	EXCLUSIVE
<u>Cat. A</u>	Captured and returned to the State of origin
Cat. B	Transferred to the enemy with additional status controlled by the enemy
Cat. C	Captured and currently retained by the enemy
Reviewed by	Eljef [Signature]
Date	8/24/93

"STRATEGIC MOBILE FORCES" (FME), THE FMLN'S REGULAR FORCE BATTALIONS.

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WHY THE DECREASE IN FMLN NUMBERS?
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7. IF THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE FMLN WERE CALCULATED IN NUMBERS ALONE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE GUERRILLAS ARE A WANING FORCE IN EL SALVADOR. HOWEVER, THE FMLN HAS INCREASED AND BROADENED THE SCOPE OF ITS ECONOMIC SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY OVER THE PAST YEAR. WHILE THE FMLN'S MILITARY EFFORT HAS DECLINED, THE GUERRILLAS ARE NOW CAUSING CONSISTENT HEAVY MATERIAL DAMAGE. IT SEEMS THAT AS FMLN UNITS HAVE BECOME YOUNGER, LESS EXPERIENCED IN MILITARY TACTICS, MORE COMPACT AND MOBILE, THEY HAVE ALSO BECOME MORE EFFECTIVE IN CARRYING OUT ECONOMIC SABOTAGE.

8. DECREASE A DELIBERATE DECISION . . .

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VARIOUS THEORIES COULD BE ADVANCED ON WHY FMLN RANKS DECREASED SUBSTANTIALLY BETWEEN 1983 AND 1986 AND LEVELLED OFF IN 1987. ONE IS THAT THE FMLN LEADERSHIP MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO WIN THE WAR, IT DOES NOT NEED TO DEFEAT THE ESAF IN FACE-TO-FACE COMBAT AND ADOPTED INSTEAD THE PROLONGED POPULAR WAR (GPP) STRATEGY DESIGNED TO EXHAUST THE ENEMY SLOWLY INTO DEFEAT. THE NEXT STEP WAS TO ESTABLISH AN OPTIMAL FORCE LEVEL TO CARRY OUT THIS STRATEGY SUCCESSFULLY. A FORCE OF ABOUT 7,000 BROKEN INTO 10-12 MAN UNITS WOULD REQUIRE LESS TRAINING, FEWER COMMANDERS, AND LESS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT THAN A FORCE OF 12,000. THE FMLN MAY HAVE ALSO DETERMINED THAT AN ARMY OF 7,000 WAS ENOUGH TO COVER THE ENTIRE NATIONAL TERRITORY EFFECTIVELY. THE FMLN'S CURRENT RESUPPLY ACTIVITIES APPEAR TO BE AT THE LEVEL WHERE ESAF EFFORTS TO DISRUPT INSURGENT RESUPPLY OPERATIONS HAVE PROVEN LARGELY INEFFECTIVE.

9. WITH A 7,000-MAN FORCE LEVEL, THE FMLN CAN APPARENTLY REPLACE ITS LOSSES (WHICH SOME ESTIMATE AT ABOUT 1,500 FOR 1987 (REF C)) WITHOUT TOO MUCH TROUBLE. IN FACT, THE FMLN COULD PROBABLY INCREASE RECRUITMENT IF IT SO DESIRED, BUT THE COST OF DOING SO MIGHT OUTWEIGH THE BENEFITS. TO TAKE ON THE ESAF FACE-TO-FACE, THE FMLN HAS TO CONSIDER THE ESAF'S

FORCE LEVEL OF ABOUT 55,000 (OF WHICH THERE ARE
32,000 COMBAT TROOPS), AN IMPOSSIBLE LEVEL FOR THE

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ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W
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FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7820
INFO AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PNT

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 SAN SALVADOR 02487

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, MCAP, ES
SUBJECT: THE FMLN TODAY: 7,000-7,800 -- LESS

FMLN TO REACH. THEREFORE, BETTER TO OPT FOR MAXIMAL
DESTRUCTION WITH MINIMAL PERSONNEL AND LOSSES:
YOUNGER TROOPS CONCENTRATING ON ECONOMIC SABOTAGE AS
THE KEY ELEMENT IN A WAR OF ATTRITION.

10. OR. FMLN FORCED TO REDUCE RANKS . . .

THE OPPOSITE THEORY IS THAT THE REDUCED FMLN NUMBERS
RESULTED FROM FACTORS LARGELY BEYOND THE GUERRILLAS'
CONTROL AND THUS REFLECT AN ACTUAL WEAKENING OF THEIR
STRENGTH. THE GREATER EFFECTIVENESS IN ECONOMIC
SABOTAGE ACHIEVED THROUGH LOWER NUMBERS WOULD

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CONSEQUENTLY BE COINCIDENTAL TO THE FMLN'S
DIMINISHING POPULARITY. GUERRILLA FIGHTERS MAY HAVE
GROWN WEARY OF FIGHTING AND, AFTER YEARS OF
UNFULFILLED PROMISES THAT VICTORY WAS NEAR, ABANDONED
THE FMLN. SOME OF THE FACTORS SUPPORTING THIS THEORY
INCLUDE:

-- INCREASED DESERTIONS. BECAUSE FMLN DESERTERS DO
NOT REPORT TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES, EXACT FIGURES ARE

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Cat. A - Caption and translation	Excluded by 1.2
Cat. B - Translation and verification	Excluded by 1.2
Cat. C - Caption and translation	Excluded by 1.2
Reviewed by:	ER
Date:	8/24/93

NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, INFORMATION COLLECTED FROM INTERROGATIONS OF CAPTURED GUERRILLAS AND DEFACTORS INDICATE THAT IN 1986-1987, DESERTIONS INCREASED THREEFOLD FROM THEIR 1984-85 LEVELS AND HAVE BECOME A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM FOR THE FMLN. THE INCREASE IN DESERTIONS MAY BE ATTRIBUTED PRIMARILY TO AN EXPANSION IN FORCED RECRUITMENT AND LARGE AND PROLONGED ESAF OPERATIONS IN OR NEAR INSURGENT BASE AREAS IN 1986 AND 1987, PRESENTING DISAFFECTED GUERRILLAS WITH MORE OPPORTUNITIES TO LEAVE THEIR UNITS. SPECIFIC FACTORS ENCOURAGING DESERTIONS INCLUDE: PERSISTENCE AND SUCCESS OF ESAF OPERATIONS, LOW MORALE, SHORTAGE OF FOOD, POOR LIVING CONDITIONS, AND FAMILY SEPARATIONS.

-- RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS. THE FMLN PRACTICES BOTH VOLUNTARY AND FORCED RECRUITMENT. VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT EMPHASIZES A PROCESS OF GRADUAL INDOCTRINATION PRIOR TO INDUCTION INTO INSURGENT RANKS. REFUGEE AND DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS AS WELL AS AREAS TARGETED FOR POLITICAL EXPANSION ARE THE MAJOR SOURCES OF FMLN VOLUNTARY RECRUITS. WHILE THE FMLN HAS TRIED TO REFRAIN FROM USING PRESS-GANG
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METHODS OF RECRUITMENT LARGELY BECAUSE OF POOR RESULTS IN THE PAST, THE GUERRILLAS CONTINUED TO USE THIS METHOD IN 1986 AND TO AN EVEN GREATER EXTENT IN 1987 -- THOSE INDUCTED APPEAR EVER YOUNGER. THE FMLN NOW HAS ENTIRE UNITS OF SO-CALLED "PIONEERS" MADE UP OF CHILDREN UNDER 15 YEARS OF AGE. SUNRISE AFTER SOME RECENT NIGHTTIME ENCOUNTERS HAS SHOCKED THE ESAF UPON DISCOVERY THAT THE ENEMY KIAs WERE CHILDREN.

-- DEFECTIONS. DEFACTORS ARE THOSE WHO LEAVE THE INSURGENCY AND PRESENT THEMSELVES TO THE ESAF. DEFECTIONS ARE A MINDR PROBLEM FOR THE FMLN AND HAVE BEEN DECREASING EVERY YEAR SINCE 1984, WHEN 162 DEFACTED. ONLY 1100 GUERRILLAS DEFACTED IN 1986 (1.3-1.4 PERCENT OF THE FMLN'S 1986 STRENGTH), AND THE PROJECTION FOR 1987 WAS HALF THAT FIGURE (32 IN FACT DEFACTED JAN.-SEPT. 1987).

-- POLITICAL ATTITUDES. THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR HAS CHANGED A GREAT DEAL SINCE THE GUERRILLA ARMIES FORMED IN THE LATE 1970S. THE COUNTRY HAS MOVED FROM REPRESSIVE DICTATORSHIP TO OPEN DEMOCRACY AND MANY OF THE INJUSTICES THAT PROMPTED THE FMLN TO TAKE UP ARMS HAVE BEEN (OR ARE BEING) CORRECTED BY THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY THE MILITARY HAVE DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY, THE

GOVERNMENT IS INSTITUTING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORMS. AND ELECTIONS ARE BECOMING FREER AND
FAIRER. THE FMLN, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS BECOME MORE
REPRESSIVE. THE GUERRILLAS PURPOSELY MINE CIVILIAN

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 88SAN SA002487

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ACTION SS-00INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----211011 242346Z /38R 241605Z FEB 88
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7821
INFO AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
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AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
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S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 05 SAN SALVADOR 02487

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, MCPAP, ES
SUBJECT: THE FMLN TODAY: 7,000-7,800 -- LESS

AREAS, KILL INNOCENT CIVILIANS, AND KIDNAP ADULTS AND CHILDREN ALIKE. IT HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT THE FMLN IS NOT FIGHTING FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, BUT FOR POWER. THE COMBINATION OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS AND FMLN REPRESSION HAS CONTRIBUTED NOT ONLY TO AN INCREASE IN GUERRILLAS DEFECTING OR DESERTING BECAUSE OF DISENCHANTMENT, BUT ALSO TO A DECREASE IN ITS POPULAR SUPPORT. THE PUBLIC HAS BEGUN TO REJECT THE FMLN AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE.

11. . . . OR PROBABLY BOTH

THE REASONS BEHIND THE REDUCTION IN FMLN COMBATANTS
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IS PROBABLY A COMBINATION OF THE ABOVE. THE ESAF'S INCREASING EFFECTIVENESS IN 1983-4 FORCED THE FMLN TO REEXAMINE AND MODIFY ITS STRATEGY. THAT STRATEGY COULD BEST BE CARRIED OUT WITH A LOWER FORCE LEVEL, IN TURN PRODUCED BY GRADUALLY DIMINISHED POPULARITY AND GROWING RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS.

12. THE END RESULT IS A LEANER AND MEANER FMLN STRUCTURE THAT WORKS BOTH TO THE ADVANTAGE AND

<p> <input type="checkbox"/> Cat. A - Confidential <input type="checkbox"/> Cat. B - Confidential <input type="checkbox"/> Cat. C - Confidential Relationship: </p> <p> Reviewed by: <i>EA</i> Date: <i>8/24/93</i> 19 </p>

DISADVANTAGE OF THE GUERRILLAS' LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES. WHILE IT HAS BECOME MORE MOBILE AND LESS VULNERABLE, THE FMLN IS CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT ONLY OCCASIONAL ATTACKS ON A LARGER AND MORE SPECTACULAR SCALE, AND THIS ONLY AFTER MONTHS OF TRAINING AND PLANNING (SUCH AS THE 1986 ATTACK ON THE THIRD BRIGADE IN SAN MIGUEL, THE JANUARY 1987 ATTACK ON THE FOURTH MILITARY DETACHMENT (DM-4) IN SAN FRANCISCO GOTERA, AND THE MARCH 1987 ATTACK ON THE FOURTH BRIGADE IN EL PARAISO). WHILE CAPABLE OF INFLECTING ENORMOUS ECONOMIC DAMAGE TO THE COUNTRY'S INFRASTRUCTURE, THE FMLN HAS BEEN FORCED TO GIVE UP THE PROSPECT OF IMMINENT MILITARY VICTORY AND TO ACCEPT THAT GAINING POWER MAY ONLY BE ACHIEVABLE IN THE LONG TERM, IF EVER.

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DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGY
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13. THE FMLN'S STRATEGIC FOCUS . . .

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ALTHOUGH FORCED TO CHANGE TACTICS IN RESPONSE TO MODIFICATIONS IN ESAF STRATEGY, THE FMLN HAS NOT LOST SIGHT OF ITS OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF OVERTHROWING THE GOVERNMENT AND SEIZING POWER. THE GUERRILLAS HAVE THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGE BECAUSE EL SALVADOR'S ECONOMY IS THE GOES' MOST VULNERABLE TARGET, PROVIDING THE IDEAL OPPORTUNITY FOR DESTABILIZING THE GOVERNMENT. THE FMLN CAN DEMORALIZE AND FRUSTRATE THE ESAF BY CARRYING OUT HIGHLY EFFECTIVE HIT-AND-RUN OPERATIONS WITH LITTLE COST TO THEMSELVES. THE ESAF CAN PROTECT LARGER FACILITIES SUCH AS DAMS, MAJOR BRIDGES, AND KEY POPULATION CENTERS, BUT IT CANNOT PROTECT EVERY POWER POLE AND FARM THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. MOREOVER, FORCING THE ESAF TO MASS ITS TROOPS AROUND URBAN CENTERS AND OTHER VULNERABLE STRATEGIC TARGETS ALLOWS THE FMLN TO OPERATE MORE FREELY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

14. . . . AND THE ESAF'S LACK OF BROAD STRATEGY

THE ESAF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE VASTLY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN BEFORE, NEEDS TO CONTINUE DEVISING SUFFICIENTLY SOPHISTICATED COUNTERSTRATEGIES. MUCH OF THE TIME IT REACTS TO FMLN OPERATIONS RATHER THAN VICE-VERSA (REF A). THE ESAF RELIED HEAVILY ON

TEXT OF TELEGRAM 885AN 5A002487

AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AGAINST THE EARLY FMLN
BATTALION-STRENGTH LEVEL FORCES. WHEN THE FMLN WENT
TO SMALL UNIT TACTICS, BOMBARDMENT ESSENTIALLY ENDED
IN FAVOR OF MILITARY SWEEP OPERATIONS. SOME AREAS

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S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 05 SAN SALVADOR 02487

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, MCAF, ES
SUBJECT: THE FMLN TODAY: 7,000-7,800 -- LESS

HAVE BEEN "SWEEP" SEVERAL TIMES OVER WITH THE FMLN DISAPPEARING UNTIL THE ESAF AGAIN WITHDRAWS -- HAVING SUFFERED NUMEROUS MINE CASUALTIES IN THE PROCESS. WHILE KEEPING THE FMLN OFF BALANCE AND UNABLE TO STRIKE, CLEARLY, A THIRD TACTICAL PROCEDURE IS NOW NEEDED TO SUPPLEMENT/REPLACE AERIAL BOMBARDMENT/SWEEPS IF THE FMLN IS GOING TO BE FURTHER REDUCED AS A FIGHTING FORCE.

15. THERE ARE AT LEAST FOUR MAIN AREAS OF FMLN VULNERABILITY: FMLN LEADERSHIP (THE GENERAL COMMAND); TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS; FOREIGN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT; AND POPULAR SUPPORT.

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CRIPPLING EVEN ONE OF THOSE AREAS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKEN THE FMLN. THE "UNITED TO RECONSTRUCT" (UPR) PROGRAM IS AIMED AT RESTORING AND IMPROVING GOVERNMENT SERVICES IN SPECIFIC AREAS, THEREBY CONVINCING PEOPLE OF THE BENEFITS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, BUT THE PROCESS IS SLOW AND VULNERABLE TO FMLN DESTRUCTION AND INTIMIDATION. THE ESQUIPULAS II PEACE ACCORDS COULD OFFER THE ESAF SOME NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO STRIKE AT THE FMLN. IF (AGAINST ALL

EXDIS REVIEW	
Col. A	Captain [unclear]
Col. B	Trinidad [unclear]
Col. C	Caetano [unclear]
Reviewed by: [unclear] EK	
Date: 8/24/93	

ODDS) NICARAGUA LIVES UP TO THE ACCORDS, IT MUST
EXPUL FROM ITS TERRITORY ALL FMLN FACILITIES AND
PERSONNEL, AS WELL AS CEASE SUPPLYING THE SALVADORAN
GUERRILLAS WITH ARMS AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL.
REMOVING THE FMLN'S SAFEHAVEN IN NICARAGUA WOULD MAKE
RESUPPLY AND TRAINING MORE DIFFICULT, THEREBY
INCREASING THE FMLN'S VULNERABILITY. IN
CONTEMPLATING FUTURE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL OPTIONS
AGAINST THE FMLN, THE ESAF SHOULD FOCUS ON SUCH AREAS
OF INCREASED GUERRILLA VULNERABILITY. REF D POINTED
TO SOME AREAS IN WHICH WE COULD HELP ESAF EXPLOIT
FMLN WEAK SPOTS.

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